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I. A CLAIM FOR REPARATIONS
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl probably expected a pleasant and un-
eventful visit to Namibia in September of 1995. Formerly the German colony of
South West Africa, the new nation of Namibia is visibly proud of its German
heritage, evident everywhere in its capital at Windhoek, in stoutly built brick
and stone colonial buildings.' Germany, in turn, is Namibia's largest provider of
foreign aid and equally proud of its role in Namibian development. However,
Anna Dean Carlson Professor of Sociology, School of Applied Social Sciences, West
Virginia University; Visiting Professor of Law, West Virginia University; Professor of Law,
City University of New York, College of Law. This Article is dedicated to my colleague, for-
mer dean, and professor, Carl Selinger, whose life and work reminds us that the broadest con-
cerns about human rights should inform the study and practice of law.
1 In fact, the Namibian parliament and government currently meet in buildings built during
the German occupation of the territory and colonial era. See Namibian Tribe Protests Against
German Massacre, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 1995, available at
http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9509&L=anthro-l&F=&S=&P=39405 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
2 See Hereros Seek Compensation on Same Basis As Nazi Slaves, SOUTHSCAN, Sept. 9,
2000, at http://allafrica.com/stories/200009090O19.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy on
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while Kohl was visiting a German community in Namibia, around three-
hundred "members of the Herero tribe led by Paramount Chief Kuaima Riruako
marched on the German embassy in Windhoek and handed in a petition for
Kohl."3 As it turns out, the Herero wanted to meet Kohl during his visit to Na-
mibia. However, Kohl refused and instead visited the coastal town of Swakop-
mund.4 The petition was a demand for reparations resulting from the near ex-
termination of the Herero by the Germans during the Herero War of 1904-07. 5
The war, although not well known in a world of far more deadly wars, was
among the twentieth century's bloodiest colonial wars, killing at least sixty-
thousand of the eighty-thousand Herero and resulting in the German seizure of
all Herero lands and cattle.6 As a result, Central Namibia was swept clean of
black occupation, setting the stage for the creation of the European agricultural
economy that prevails today.7
Herero Paramount Chief Kuaimi Riruako demanded reparations of $600
million (US).8 After delivering the petition, Riruako stated, "We think we have a
legitimate claim for reparations as a result of the war and genocide committed
against the Hereros by the German army." 9 The Herero Traditional Authority, he
file with the West Virginia Law Review).
3 See Namibian Tribe Protests Against German Massacre, supra note 1. Among those who
presented the petition was an "army" of "truppenspeiler," wearing carefully mended colonial
German uniforms. The truppenspieler, literally "troop players" appear everywhere at Herero
occasions. See Wolfgang Werner, Playing Soldiers: The Truppenspieler Movement Among the
Herero of Namibia, 1915-1945, 16 J. S. AFR. STUD. 476, 485-502 (1990). The movement is
unique to Namibia, believed to originate in 1905, when a troop of Herero trained and uniformed
by the Germans, deserted to join the Herero in the war. If legend holds, the group later drew a
German troop into an ambush by calling to them in flawless German. The tradition continued as
a benevolent society, still with German military traditions, training with sticks and old military
band instruments. See id. at 483-85. The group also became active in Herero politics as a revi-
talization movement. See id. at 485-94. Thus, when the group marched and the petition was
handed over to the German Embassy, it was done so by what looked like remnants of a black
colonial German army troop, now in the service of the Herero nation.
4 Herero Tribal Members Demand to Meet Chancellor Kohl, Seek Compensation, BRITISH
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Sept. 18, 1995, available at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=205ba27a0d027a90c572f6e7638f33a9&_docnum=3&wchp
=dGLSzS-ISlzV&_md5=0e85c932c5b337983b15bb57bb60cab4 (copy on file with the West
Virginia Law Review).
5 See Namibian Tribe Protests Against German Massacre, supra note 1.
6 Delroy Constantine-Simms, Hitler's Forgotten Namibian Victims, ELECTRONIC MAIL &
GUARDIAN, Sept. 26, 1997, at http://www.mg.co.zalmg/news/97sep2/26sep-hitler.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
7 For several different accounts of this development, see generally infra, note 24 and
accompanying text.
8 Namibian Tribe Protests Against German Massacre, supra note 1. The actual claim was
for $2.2 billion (Namibian). See id.
9 Id.
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continued, was prepared to take its case to the United Nations if Bonn rejected
the claim.' 0 And, in a surprising move, Chief Riruako, through the Chief Hosea
Kutako Foundation, recently filed a lawsuit against three German companies in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asking for $2 billion (U.S.) in
reparations, asserting the companies were in a "brutal alliance" with imperial
Germany in the Herero War."
The Namibian government has opposed the Herero claim for repara-
tions.' 2 Heavily dependant on German aid, and dominated by the rival Ovambo
tribe, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the ruling party,
has taken the position that all Namibian tribes were victimized by colonial ex-
ploitation, and therefore, no group in particular should be singled out to receive
reparation payments.' 3 But the Herero, now numbering about 125,000, and the
leading opposition tribe, have persisted in pursuing their claim. It has served to
define Herero identity within Namibia, setting the Herero people apart. '
In a modem Africa, with many different development regimes compet-
ing, the Herero claim deserves careful analysis. A model of "reparations" has an
obvious historical root in the colonization of Africa. In addition, a pattern of
violent land seizures in Zimbabwe underscores the need for effective land re-
form programs that, in turn, are blocked throughout southern Africa by a lack of
10 See id.
11 Christof Maletsky, Hereros Up the Ante in Reparations Drives, THE NAMIBIAN, Sept. 5,
2001, http://www.namibian.com.na/2001/September/news/0ll0622967.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review). The lawsuit against Deutsche
Bank, Terex Corporation, and Woermann Line (now SAF Marine) was filed in United States
courts, according to Riruako, because "there will be minimal outside influence compared to if
they lodged the case in Germany." Id. Riruako also promised to file a similar suit, in United
States District Courts, against Germany. Obviously, these lawsuits could occupy United States
courts for some number of years, even considering jurisdictional issues. One early view is that
these lawsuits are primarily intended for their political effect. This Article is not further con-
cerned with these recently filed American lawsuits, but focuses on a broader question of the
Herero reparations claims in their Namibian and German context.
12 Hereros Seek Compensation on Same Basis As Nazi Slaves, supra note 2.
13 Hereros Seek Compensation on Same Basis as Nazi Slaves, supra note 2; Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., Its Past on Its Sleeve, Tribe Seeks Bonn's Apology, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at
3, available at 1998 WL 5413415; Reparations Not on the Table, THE NAMIBIAN, Aug. 31,
2000, available at 2000 WL 6416303. Some might take issue with the SWAPO's assertion that
each tribe was treated equally. See, e.g., John Grobler, The Tribe Germany Wants to Forget,
ELECTRONIC MAIL & GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 1998, at
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98mar1/13mar-herero.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (stating
that "[u]nlike the politically dominant Owambo people - who are well-represented in the ruling
South West African Peoples Organisation (Swapo) - the Hereros lost most of their grazing
areas .... ) (copy on file with West Virginia Law Review). The Namibian government might
also have its own reparations claim against Germany, but it has never chosen to assert it. Lynn
Berat, Genocide: The Namibian Case Against Germany, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 165, 207-10
(1993).
14 Grobler, supra note 13.
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funds. 15 German reparations would allow the Herero, still a cattle herding peo-
ple, to repurchase a substantial portion of their "stolen" lands and return their
cattle to their traditional range. Ironically, under the colonial law of conquest,
the Herero cannot recover nor be compensated for their "stolen" lands because
the German conquest of their lands provides a legal basis for German land own-
ership. 16 But their claim for reparations for genocide 17 is based on broader rights
in international and natural law and therefore may provide a better chance for
success.
The Herero did not "invent" their demand for reparations. Rather, it is
derived entirely from their careful reading of modern German history. Germany
is making reparations to both individual Jews and the State of Israel for acts of
genocide in the 1930s and 1940s, scarcely thirty years after the Herero War.' 8
The Herero ask an obvious question: what is the legal - or moral - distinction
between German genocide directed at Jews and German genocide directed at
Africans? Surely, in the modern world, a racial distinction cannot account for
this difference in policy. Or is the distinction based on some meaningful differ-
ence between genocide in the Herero War and World War Two? As it was sim-
ply put by Mburumba Kerina, a Herero activist, "[T]he concerns of the Hereros
must be seen in the same light as that of the Jewish people." 19
The Herero claim for reparations is directly grounded in the characteri-
zation of Germany's history as particularly violent and as a former racist impe-
rialist and colonial power, with a history of acknowledging this violence by pay-
ing reparations. Indeed, there is evidence that the virulent racism that promoted
the holocaust not only the characterized German colonization of Africa, but was
15 Andrew Meldrum, Black Peasants Have Waited for 110 Years, Says White Minister, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 18732122; Isabel Hilton, Clinging to Coloni-
alism's Wreckage, WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN, Apr. 20, 2000,
http:/www.sn.apc.orglwmail/issues/0004201NEWS39.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy
on file with the West Virginia Law Review); Zimbabwe on Knife Edge over Farm Invasions,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2774307.
16 SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 5-66 (1996).
17 Genocide is a politically controversial and overused term. It may be defined as "a form of
one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that
group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator." FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN,
THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 23 (1990). A pattern of indiscriminate mass mur-
der, then, does not define genocide. The core is a state based plan to destroy a defined group.
Under this definition, most colonial wars were not genocidal because, as vicious as they were,
the plan was generally to subjugate native people, not eliminate them.
18 Gabriel Schoenfeld, Holocaust Reparations: A Growing Scandal, COMMENT., Sept. 1,
2000, available at 2000 WL 33455762 (containing a brief history of German reparations).
Since the implementation of this reparations regime, provided for by statute in 1951, Germany
has paid $55 billion (US) to both the state of Israel and four million individual Jewish victims
worldwide, over a fifty year period. See id. The Herero demand for $600 million is about 1% of
this total amount, but much less if adjusted for inflation.
19 Hereros Seek Compensation on Same Basis as Nazi Slaves, supra note 2.
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also partially formed there: 20 the Germans began experiments with sterilization
in the name of the science of eugenics, the creation of a "master race," in Ger-
man South West Africa at the turn of the century. Herero prisoners of war were
the s*ubjects of these experiments.2 ' Similarly, Germany's sudden and late entry
into the colonial enterprise in Africa was prompted by its military victories in
the Franco-Prussian War, prompting further expansion of German authority
through military power.22 Consequently, the Herero seem to have a strong ar-
gument that they too deserve reparations from Germany. However, before one
can completely understand the true nature of their claim for reparations, a closer
look at the Herero War is necessary.
II. THE HERERO WAR: A COLONIAL WAR OF GENOCIDE
Like most colonial histories, the colonial history of Namibia is complex
and still, from the standpoint of the black people who live there, largely unwrit-
ten.23 The Herero War, an exception to this history, has been the subject of a
number of books, with scholars drawn to the unique character of German colo-
nial violence.24 Although a number of meanings can be drawn from the war, the
central outcome in terms of land law is clear: Germany terminated by conquest
all Herero land rights in South West Africa, leaving the nation with no land at
all.25 Herero lands were then "sold" to settlers - ninety percent of them German
26- on favorable terms, with long-term loans subsidized by the government.
20 A British report on German treatment of black people in South West Africa concluded
that German colonialism was particularly violent and vicious, tolerating sadistic and excessive
violence against natives. See ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, WINDHOEK, REPORT ON THE NATIVES OF
SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THEIR TREATMENT BY GERMANY (1918) (copy on file with author).
The report was later withdrawn and must be judged in the context of British political goals in
the immediate post World War One period. However, the evidence published in the report,
including numerous photographs of black people showing evidence of torture, is graphic. Obvi-
ously, the issue of the uniquely violent and racist character of German colonialism is relevant in
the debate over the roots of the Holocaust.
21 Constantine-Simms, supra note 6.
22 LEwIS. H. GANN & PETER DUIGNAN, THE RULERS OF GERMAN AFRICA, 1884-1914 at 1
(1977).
23 There is a growing body of literature in this "new" Namibian history. See generally
HELMUT BLEY, SOUTH WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE, 1894-1915 (1971); WOLFRAM
HARTMANN, JEREMY SILVESTER & PATRICIA HAYES, THE COLONISING CAMERA: PHOTOGRAPHS
IN THE MAKING OF NAMIBIAN HISTORY (1998); PATRICIA HAYES, JEREMY SILVESTER, MARION
WALLACE & WOLFRAM HARTMANN, NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE: MOBILITY AND
CONTAINMENT, 1915-1946 (1998).
24 See, e.g., JON BRIDGEMAN, THE REVOLT OF THE HEREROS (1981); HORST DRECHSLER, LET
Us DIE FIGHTING: THE STRUGGLE OF THE HERERO AND NAMA AGAINST GERMAN IMPERIALISM
(1884-1915) (1980); JAN-BART GEWALD, HERERO HEROES (1999).
25 WOLFGANG WERNER, No ONE WILL BECOME RICH: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE
HERERO RESERVES IN NAMIBIA, 1915-1946 at 47 (1998).
26 RICHARD MOORSoM, TRANSFORMING A WASTED LAND 21-24 (1982); WERNER, supra note
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These farms are now the heart of Namibian agriculture, occupying a wide swath
from Omaruru to Gobabis and the Botswana border, the entire country to the
west, north, and east of Windhoek.
This violent dispossession followed a short colonial history. The ova-
Herero were traditional occupants of the high plains of central Namibia.27 A
Bantu tribe, the Herero had moved south into this region from Angola, via Ka-
okoland, in northwestern Namibia, arriving about 1750.28 A series of wars with
the Nama, who live to the south, occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, desta-
bilizing the entire region.29 Germany first arrived in South West Africa only in
1884, using the dubious private land claims of a German businessman, Adolf
Luderitz, as the legal basis for establishing a German protectorate over a vast
desert hinterland, the first German colony in Africa.30 The Herero were not in-
volved in these coastal land treaties, but on December 29, 1884, Chief
Kamaherero, at Omaruru, entered into a treaty of protection with Great Britain,
then engaged in a diplomatic dispute with Germany over what is now Na-
mibia.31 Great Britain soon abandoned the contest, withdrawing to the Cape
Colony and leaving the native people of South West Africa, with or without
treaties of protection, to the Germans.32
Kamaherero had negoti*ated a worthless protection agreement with the
British, who were unwilling to live up to its terms.33 Germans were everywhere
in his country and Kamaherero boldly stated: "I do not want the Germans to
have any of my country and never did.",34 It is, however, also clear that the Her-
ero did negotiate schutzvertrags, treaties of protection, with Germany in Oka-
handja and Omaruru in October 1885.35 This diplomatic history is known
through colonial sources, and Herero motivation can only be surmised. At the
simplest level, the presence of the Germans required some kind of Herero re-
sponse, and agreeing to the treaty of protection was, on its face, a moderate ac-
commodation. In more complex terms, Herero chiefs were (and still are)
25, at 48; Wolfe Schmoekel, The Myth of the White Farmer: Commericial Agriculture in Na-
mibia, 1900-1983, 18 INT'LJ. AFR. HIST. STUD. 1, 1-11 (1985).
27 See WERNER, supra note 25, at 27.
28 J.S. MALAN, PEOPLES OF NAMIBIA 68-69 (1995). See generally CARL HUGO LINSINGEN
HAHN, HEINRICH VEDDER & LOUIS FOURIE, THE NATIVE TRIBES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA 153-
208 (1928).
29 See supra note 28.
30 J.H. ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1880-1894: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GERMAN
AUTHORITY IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 46-65 (1968).
31 Id. at 78-83.
32 Id. at 66-83.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 105.
35 Id.
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autonomous. They had a decentralized tribal government, with families and
herds spread over hundreds of miles. Different chiefs may well have had differ-
ent strategies to deal with German authority and the Germans were beginning to
implement a "divide and rule" strategy. It is also unclear what the Herero be-
lieved these "treaties of protection" meant. Such agreements did not, on their
face, cede land or sovereignty. 36 Rather, the Germans agreed to "protect" Herero
interests from rival tribes, themselves often armed by the Germans.37 Thus, the
political instability of late-nineteenth century South West Africa encouraged
such agreements.
In 1895, German troops intervened in Okahandja on behalf of Chief
Samuel Maharero in a Herero succession dispute. 38 This military action ce-
mented an alliance between the Germans and Maharero that lasted for nine
years.39 During this time, Maharero "sold" vast tracts of Herero lands to Ger-
mans under various kinds of arrangements, some more "legal" than others. n For
example, German traders took vast quantities of land in exchange for trade
goods, including liquor.41 They, in turn, sold the land to German farmers at huge
profits.42 Other Herero land was empty as a rinderpest epidemic killed many of
their cattle.4 3
Some Herero lands were lost through the actions, even duplicity, of
their own chiefs who "sold" the land to the Germans. 44 By 1902, the Herero
only retained about 46,000 cattle of an estimated 100,000 head held ten years
before.45 In contrast, 1,051 German farmers and traders held 44,500 head. 4 The
number of German settlers increased from 1,774 in 1895 to 4,640 in 1903. 41 Of
83.5 million hectares of land in the colony, 31.4 million remained in African
hands48 - although these figures include much land that belonged to Nama and
36 MARK FRANK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-206 (1926); MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA:
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 46-48 (1985).
37 ESTERHUYSE, supra note 30, at 105-06.
38 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 84-91.
39 See id. at 91-109.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 129-36; WERNER, supra note 25, at 43.
43 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 129-36.
44 WERNER, supra note 25, at 44.
45 Id..
46 Id.
47 Id. at 43
48 Id. at 43-44. These data represent cataclysmic social change: there were virtually no
German farmers before the early 1890s. It took scarcely the decade of the 1890s for German
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other tribes.49 Therefore, even before the Herero War, most of their lands had
been alienated.
Herero claims for reparations are, therefore, not primarily based on this
loss of land, but on the genocide that followed. The most important legal base of
their claim is the sweeping orders of General Lothar Von Trotha in the Herero
War. In an infamous proclamation, issued on October 2, 1904, he ordered all
Herero men killed and all their lands and cattle seized:
I the great General of the German troops send this letter to the
Herero people. The Herero are no longer German subjects....
The Herero people must however leave the land. If the populace
does not do this I will force them with the Groot Rohr [can-
non].Within the German borders every Herero, with or without
a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer ac-
cept women and children, I will drive them back to their people,
or I will let them be shot at. These are my words to the Herero
people.50
The next day, Herero prisoners who had been sentenced to death were
hung in the presence of thirty Herero prisoners. After the hanging, the procla-
mation was read to the prisoners. Then, after handing out printed copies of the
document in the Herero language, he drove the prisoners, including women and
children, out into the Kalahari Desert.5 '
The major result of this pronouncement was not about "land," but about
genocide. The Herero, including women and children, died after being driven
out into the Kalahari and denied access to water holes. Only a relatively few
casualties of the war were due to military actions; mass starvation over months
killed most of the tribe. Although the war was soon over, the suffering and dy-
ing continued for several more years, as the Herero were confined to prison
camps or forced to hide far out in the desert.52 The land that the Herero "owned"
was treated indiscriminately; it was all seized by the German colonial state.53
Moreover, any defects in the legal nature of the land titles sold by Maharero
disappeared; there was no Herero land left anywhere in German South West
herds to grow larger than Herero herds.
49 WERNER, supra note 25, at 43-44.
50 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 172-73. Gewald has dismissed the view that Von Trotha's
proclamation has been interpreted "out of context," concluding that the proclamation meant
what it threatened, a policy of genocide. Obviously, the fact that it was printed in the Herero
language and distributed to women and children who were about to be driven out into the desert
(so that they could widely distribute it) demonstrates that it was carefully planned.
51 Id. at 173
52 Id. at 185-91.
53 Id. at 173-91.
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Africa.54
The details of the Herero War are well known and are not in serious
dispute.55 Historian Jan-Bart Gewald constructs a convincing account that the
war was used as a pretext by the Germans to annihilate the Herero56 in order to
acquire control over the remaining Herero lands.57 At least some Herero, of-
fended by increasing German movement on to Herero lands, and subjected to
demeaning and inhuman treatment by German colonists and traders, rose in re-
volt. Once the revolt was under way, the Germans refused all attempts for a ne-
gotiated resolution, moving instead to a policy of genocide to sweep the Herero
off their valuable lands entirely.58 This effort was not the only German colonial
war in Namibia; there was a series of such wars. The Nama, in fact, took advan-
tage of the Herero War, attacking the Germans from the south, and carrying on a
guerilla war for several years after the Herero were defeated.59 But the Herero
War was by far the most violent and the only war waged under a written policy
of committing genocide.
The census of 1911 gives the Herero population in South West Africa as
15,130, down from about 80,000 before the war. A few thousand additional
Herero, including Chief Samuel Maharero, had sought refuge in western Bechu-
analand (now Botswana).60 Perhaps a few hundred to a thousand more had fled
54 Id. at 190-91.
55 Like much of German history, there is a right wing "revisionist" interpretation of the
Herero War that denies that genocide occurred. Researcher into the Waterberg Tragedy of 1904
Presents a New Radical Version, WINDHOEK OBSERVER, July 21, 2001, at 2 (summarizing an
uncited University of Hamburg (Germany) masters thesis claiming that (1) fewer Herero were
killed in the Herero War than modem scholars claim and (2) that these deaths were not caused
by actions of the German army but by starvation). A point-by-point rebuttal was published a
few weeks later. Jeremy Silvester, Werner Hillebrecht & Casper Erichsen, Waterberg Tragedy
of 1904 Triggers Hot Debate, WINDHOEK OBSERVER, Aug. 4, 2001, at 4. See also Jeremy
Silvester, Werner Hillebrecht & Casper Erichsen, The Herero Holocaust? The Disputed History
of the 1904 Genocide, http://www.namibweb.comlhererohol.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2002)
(copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review). The major accounts of the Herero War agree
on the essential details of the deaths of over 60,000 Herero people. See supra note 26 and ac-
companying text.
56 See generally GEWALD, supra note 24.
57 Id. at 191.
58 For the best account of the war, see id. at 141-91. Previously, there were two standard
accounts. See DRESCHLER, supra note 24; supra note 24. Neither account disputes that the im-
mediate cause of the Herero uprising was the loss of their lands, but Gewald challenges the idea
that it was a widely planned general revolt of the Herero people.
59 BRIDGEMAN, supra note 24, at 132-63.
60 Herero are still returning from Botswana to Namibia, with hundreds being supported
under poor conditions in a refugee camp at Gam, 600 kilometers northeast of Windhoek. See
Christof Maletsky, Returned Hereros "Dumped" Says Report, ELECTRONIC MAIL & GUARDIAN,
Mar. 23, 1998, at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98mar2/23mar-herero.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
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to Kaokoland, a remote area beyond the police line but still in German South
West Africa,6' and a few more escaped to Angola.62 Thus, at most 20,000 Her-
ero survived the war, possibly no more than 17,000, leaving at least 60,000 to
63,000 dead - seventy-five to eighty percent of their pre-war population.63
Within Namibia, Herero cattle were all lost and their herding culture was deci-
mated.64 These remaining Herero survived as refugees, living in absolute pov-
erty in camps or near mission stations. High death rates continued in the post-65 emnatowar years, as the result of disease and starvation. Thus, the German act of
genocide against the Herero was striking and deliberate, intended both to free
their lands for white settlement and also to deter similar uprisings by other Na-tive tribes in South West Africa.
III. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE CLAIM FOR HERERO REPARATIONS
The Herero claim for reparations began within the context of the next
ninety years of colonial history. Modern Namibia looks much the way the Ger-
mans left it in 1915, when German rule suddenly ended. 66 After a brief period of
British administration following the capture of South West Africa in World War
One, the colony was turned over, under the provisions of a League of Nations
class "c" mandate, to South African administration.67 The British plans were for
a well-ordered agricultural colonial-settler state. German farmers were left on
their lands, including most of the Herero lands, the agricultural heartland, with
new, often very marginal, lands to the north and south opened up to Boer set-
tlers.68 South West Africa became a rich agricultural land, heavily subsidized by
61 Michael Bollig, Power and Trade in Precolonial and Early Colonial Northern Kaoko-
land, 1860s-1940s, in PATRICIA HAYES, JEREMY SILVESTER, MARION WALLACE & WOLFGANG
HARTMAN, NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE: MOBILITY AND CONTAINMENT, 1915-1946 at
175-93 (1998) [hereinafter NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE). It seems that a few Herero
survived the war with their cattle in the safety of Kaokoland. German troops did not operate
north of the police line, a line across northern Namibia delineating the boundary of white set-
tlement.
62 Gesine Kruger & Dag Henrichsen, We have Been Captives Long Enough, We Want to be
Free: Land, Uniforms, and Politics in the History of the Herero in the Interwar Period, in
NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE, supra note 61, at 149-74.
63 BRIDGEMAN, supra note 24, at 164 (putting the number of dead Herero at 65,000, but this
may underestimate the number of people who escaped to Botswana). However, the population
data of Herero in Botswana and Kaokoland are estimates. Colonial authorities, German or Brit-
ish, had no reason to keep accurate statistics on surviving Herero who, in any case, were hiding
in very remote regions. Ironically, the 1911 census is probably accurate: German colonial au-
thorities were compulsive record keepers. GANN & DUIGNAN, supra note 22.
64 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 185-204.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 JOHN DUGARD, THE NAMIBIA/SWA DISPUTE 27-88 (1973).
68 Id.
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the apartheid-era South African state.69
The Herero, who joined the British forces in the invasion of South
West Africa, began a cultural renaissance under the South Africans. By all sorts
of means, including large-scale squatting and various sharecropping agreements
with white farmers, they regained their cattle and re-occupied vast tracts of their
former lands, albeit in the more remote and undeveloped regions. 70 This history
is remarkable, given the racist, and later apartheid-era policies of South Africa,
but it sets the political stage for the position of the Herero in modem Namibia
and for their claim for reparations.
This history is important because it structures the logic of Herero repa-
rations. The underlying issue is the forcible deprivation of their lands which, in
turn, means that there is no place to graze Herero cattle, the center of their cul-
ture.71 However, no direct reparation for land is likely because, historically, in-
digenous lands taken by European settler societies have rarely been returned.
Although the Herero often talk about "land" in the context of reparations, the
actual demand for economic reparations is based on genocide and on the merci-
less and systematic killing and starvation of the Herero during the 1904-07
war.72 This demand is grounded in the logic of reparations for Jews and other
peoples victimized by the Germans before and in World War Two, analogizing
the Herero War to German genocide against the Jews and not to other African
and Asian colonial wars.
It would be both a futile and dishonorable discourse to venture into any
kind of a comparative analysis of genocide - and such a discussion is irrelevant
for purposes of the Herero position.73 Genocide is genocide: murdering an Afri-
can tribe cannot be rotely compared to murdering a European people, or a Euro-
pean nation.74 Nothing that the Herero say in any way dismisses or diminishes
the unique crimes that Germany committed against Jews. Modem international
law of reparations is dominated by extensive Jewish claims for reparations
against Germany and other countries,75 but this is not the limit of reparations
69 BRIGITTE LAU & PETER REINER, 100 YEARS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
COLONIAL NAMIBIA (1993).
70 See DUGARD, supra note 67.
71 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72 Grobler, supra note 13.
73 This statement is not meant to dismiss the importance of that discussion, nor of seeking a
better understanding of the meaning of genocide in human actions. Rather, it is grounded in the
futility of rank ordering various categories of "genocide" for various legal purposes. There is
substantial literature on all aspects of genocide. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 17.
74 Scholarly efforts to better understand genocide by a comparative approach are few, but
the comparative method does offer insight. See, e.g., Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historical and
Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Im-
punity to Retributive Justice, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 503 (1998).
75 CHRISTIAN PROSS, BELINDA COOPER & ERICH H. LOEWY, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE
STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAzI TERROR (1998).
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claims. Even in the context of World War Two, reparations have been paid to
others, including $1.2 billion to Americans of Japanese descent for their impris-
onment and loss of their lands.76 Also reparations have been made in a parallel
settlement to Japanese Canadians,77 and a case is pending against the Japanese
for reparations for Korean "comfort women," forced into prostitution by the
Japanese army.78 Other European claims, including that of the Romani people,
raised by other peoples subjected to mass extermination in concentration camps,
have failed.79 None of these claims for reparations compare to the Jewish holo-
caust, but their success, nevertheless, represents important advances in human
rights law.
The Herero are very aware of these legally recognized reparation
claims and base their claim accordingly. Mburumba Kerina, a Herero leader,
commented on the forced sexual slavery of Herero women by Germans. Com-
paring this to the case of the Japanese "comfort women," Kerina explained,
probably with more than a touch of irony: "Hey, that's my grandmother - a
comfort woman... If the Japanese could pay for that, the Germans could. 8 °
This careful attention to the existing international law of reparations distin-
guishes the Herero claim for reparations. The narrow discussion is a more gen-
eral inquiry into the appropriateness of reparations as a political and legal rem-
edy to the damage to various peoples caused by twentieth century colonial wars.
If these situations are reasonably analogous to existing reparations claims, to
dismiss them out of hand must turn on considerations that can only be called
racist. If these claims are well grounded legally, then broader policy issues may
be implicated and must be heard.
There is no consistent legal basis for any of the modern reparations re-
gimes. The concept of reparations is rooted in natural law, the common law, and
76 Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Ameri-
can Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 510 (1998). See also ROGER DANIELS, SANDRA TAYLOR, &
HARRY KITANO, JAPANESE AMERICANS: FROM RELOCATION TO REDRESS (1986); MITCHELL T.
MAKI, HARRY H. KITANO & MEGAN S. BERTHOLD, ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: How
JAPANESE AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS (1999).
77 ROY M. KOBAYASHI, JUSTICE IN OUR TIME: THE JAPANESE CANADIAN REDRESS
SEiTLEMENT (1994).
78 Tong Yu, Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War 11, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J.
528, 528-32 (1995).
79 Barry A. Fisher, No Roads Lead to Rom: The Fate of the Romani People Under the Nazis
and in Post-War Restitution, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 513, 516-20 (1999). The Roma are more
commonly referred to as "gypsies," half a million of whom were killed by Germany at the time
of World War Two.
80 McNeil, supra note 13, at 3. Kerena is apparently making a political point about the
comparison between the Herero situation and the Japanese lawsuit: there is a legal distinction.
Many "comfort women" are alive and are personally suing the Japanese government for repara-
tions for their injuries. None of the Herero women who were forced into sexual slavery after
1905 are alive, and these particular German actions are not a basis for contemporary Herero
claims.
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international law; it is an equitable principle that the beneficiary of an ill-gotten
gain should make restitution, both as an act of contrition and good will, but also
simply to restore the victim to some part of their previous life.8' As a political
matter when related to the specific context of war reparations, it is generally"winners" who demand restitution from "losers." The original post World War
Two German reparations law, Law Number 59 on Restitution of Property Stolen
in the Course of the Aryanization of the Economy, was adopted by the U.S.
military government and imposed on Germany in November, 1947.82 However,
within the modern world, liberal democracies have used the language of repara-
tions in making voluntary payments through various statutory regimes to their
own indigenous or minority populations. American and Canadian payments to
Japanese citizens as reparations for wartime injustice are the most extensive
example,83 although many payments to indigenous peoples are broadly of this
type.84 Although these Japanese reparation claims included complex litigation
strategies, these ultimately failed and the final reparations settlements were po-
litical, voted by the U.S. Congress and the Canadian Parliament.85
The Jewish claims against Germany also avoided litigation and began
with ally-ordered regimes to return stolen Jewish property but proceeded to a
formal claim, filed on behalf of the State of Israel, as the lawful representative
of the Jewish people, with the German government. 86 A series of negotiations
followed, with a final agreement resulting through political processes, and voted
81 CARL BERGMANN, THE HISTORY OF REPARATIONS (1927); Anthony Gifford, The Legal
Basis for a Claim of Reparations, available at http://www.arm.arc.co.uklegalbasis.html (un-
published manuscript, presented at the First Pan African Congress on Reparations, Abujua,
Nigeria, Apr. 27-29, 1993) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review). While the con-
cept appears in many places in the law, it is at the core of the doctrine of torts, the legal redress
of private wrongs, as well as criminal law, the legal redress of public wrongs.
82 PROSS, COOPER & LOEWY, supra note 75, at 19. Pross, Cooper, and Loewy also have a
detailed history of World War Two German reparations policy. See id. at 19-70. The concept of
war reparations extends well back into European history, routinely negotiated as wars were
concluded.
83 See supra note 76. The United States has also paid five thousand dollars each to 2,200
Latin Americans of Japanese ancestry. Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disre-
gard for International Law in the World War 11 Internment of Japanese Peruvians - A Case
Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275, 275 (1998).
84 See, e.g., Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal
Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai 'i's Annexation, and Pos-
sible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463 (1995); Carter D. Frantz, Getting Back What Was
Theirs? The Reparation Mechanisms for the Land Rights Claims of the Maori and the Navajo,
16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 489 (1998).
85 MAKI, KITANO & BERTHOLD, supra note 76, at 121-36 (1999); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987);
Barbara L. Tang, The Japanese Internment and Reparations: Creating a Judicial or Statutory
Cause of Action Against the Federal Government for Constitutional Violations, 21 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 979 (1988).
86 PROSS, COOPER & LOEWY, supra note 75, at 19-49.
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on by the German Parliament. The original reparations legislation has been re-
vised and expanded several times, with substantial opposition within Germany.87
The legal basis of Herero reparations is rooted in both of these tradi-
tions, although it lacks support from the Namibian government. The Herero
reparations claim has never been formally acted on by the German government,
but it was dismissed out of hand in a speech by Roman Herzog, President of
88Germany. In a 1998 trip to Namibia, Herzog was quoted as saying that "no
international legislation existed at the time under which ethnic minorities could
get reparations." 89 Herero activist Mberumba Kerina countered by claiming that
the Hague Convention of 1899 outlawed "reprisals against civilians on the los-
ing side." 90 In the same exchange, Herzog dismissed the idea of an apology be-
cause too much time had passed to make sense - and also fired his translator for
misinterpreting his statements. 9'
To the extent that this exchange begins to structure the Herero case and
the German response to it, several important issues emerge leaving an unclear
legal basis for their reparations claim. President Herzog describes the legal basis
for reparations differently than do the Herero. Herzog put his response in the
language of colonialism, with his clear historical reference to the colonial domi-
nation of ethnic minorities serving as a basis for reparations as supported by no
"international legislation at the time." Thus, for Herzog, colonialism was "legal"
in 1905 under international legislation, therefore ending the discussion of Her-
ero reparations.
This analysis, however, is not the basis of the Herero claim. Rather,
the Herero locate their claim in terms of the international laws of war as defined
in the Second Hague Convention of 1899, a convention at which the Germans
were represented and which binds the European powers as they go about their
"business" of civilized warfare, that is warfare between signatory nations.92
Unless Germany seeks to argue, in the twenty-first century, that there was, after
87 See id. See generally Frederick Honig, The Reparations Agreement Between Israel and
the General Republic of Germany, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 564 (1985).
88 Grobler, supra note 13.
89 See id.
9 See id.
91 See id. Herzog's statement is disingenuous. No laws existed at the time of the Holocaust
that required reparations either. Rather, the weight of world opinion and changing ideas of
human rights made such reparations politically necessary. The pretextual firing of the inter-
preter reinforces this view, German and English language education in Namibia meets a high
standard.
92 Article 2 provides that the convention's provisions "are only binding on the contracting
powers in case of a war between them." Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War by Land, July 29, 1899, art. 2, available at
http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/textsABHOl5.txt. [hereinafter Laws and Cus-
toms of War by Land]. Therefore, the Hague Convention of 1899 did not apply to the Herero
War.
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1899, one set of rules for European nations conducting wars with each other and
a completely different set for those same nations conducting "colonial" wars, or
even more bluntly put, wars against "ethnic" peoples, it is in an untenable moral
position.
The Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War by Land was
signed on July 29, 1899 and took effect on September 4, 1900.93 Intended to
regulate modern warfare, the Convention contains a number of provisions that,
in their plain language, were apparently violated by Germany in the Herero War.
Article 4 requires that "prisoners of war in the power of the hostile government.
must be honorably treated. 94 Article 7 provides that "the government into
whose hands prisoners of war have fallen is bound to maintain them., 95 Article
23 states that "it is especially prohibited to kill or wound treacherously individu-
als belonging to the hostile nation or army; to declare that no quarter will be
given; to destroy or seize the enemies property, unless such destruction or sei-
zure be imperatively demanded by the necessity of war., 9 6 Finally, Article 46
states that "family honors and rights, individual lives and private property...
must be respected. 97
It would follow that a systemic Violation of that Convention, for ex-
ample, in an order to kill all the Herero and starve their women and children,
clearly a declaration that "no quarter will be given, would be legally action-
able under whatever regime of international enforcement the Hague Convention
recognizes, but for the fact that the Herero were not represented at the Hague,
and could not, therefore, sign the convention. Thus, the issue is not the literal
application of the Hague Convention to the Herero War. Rather, it is the Con-
vention as a statement of international customary law. Importantly for the Her-
ero, their claim can be analagized to Jewish and Japanese reparation claims,
which are also not based on the Hague Convention, but on more general princi-
ples of human rights.
This leaves unanswered President Herzog's defense: that colonialism
and, apparently, colonial genocide, was legal in 1905. 99 Although his position
93 See Laws and Customs of War by Land, supra note 92.
94 See id. at art. 4.
95 Id. at art. 7.
96 Id. at art. 23.
97 Id. at art. 46
98 Id. at art. 23.
99 Herzog's position is clearly the official position of the German government. It was
restated in July 2001 by Dr. Helga Strachwitz, German Commissioner for African Affairs, who,
when asked about "reparations for crimes against humanity committed during the German co-
lonial period" responded that "there was no legal basis on which such payments could be made
after all these years." Crispin Inambao, Germany Offers Namibia $20 Million in Land Aid, THE
NAMIBIAN, July 19, 2001, http://www.namibian.com.na/2001/july/news/013da6088.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
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may literally be true, that, again, is not the issue. The political and legal reasons
for not opening up four hundred years of colonialism to broad claims of repara-
tions are clear, regardless of the justice of the claims. Such a claim parallels
other equally broad based claims, most prominently in the growing discussion of
reparations for African slavery.1°° There is a substantial literature - including in
law reviews - on these legal arguments.10' Representative John Conyers has
introduced a resolution into the House of Representatives requiring the explora-
tion of the issue of reparations for slavery in the United States.'0 2 A Pan-African
Congress on Reparations was held in Nigeria in 1993 and claims of reparations
underscore some of the discourse on the rebuilding of African economies. 10 3
Although these efforts have most often been dismissed as politically impossible,
existing legal doctrines of equity and natural law, as well as the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution, lend both moral and legal
credibility to the case for black reparations for both slavery, primarily involving
the tens of millions of overseas blacks, and for the devastation of colonialism,
primarily involving blacks still living on the African continent.
However, it is important to see that the Herero claim is much more
narrowly framed than the above claims are. While in the long course of human
history there has clearly and unfortunately been an equally long history of geno-
cide, the law of reparations is much more limited. Modem reparations claims,
modeled after the Jewish claims against Germany, are most often very specific.
The Herero are aware of this, explaining the precise basis for their claim as acts
10o BORIS BITKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); CLARENCE J. MUMFORD, RACE
AND REPARATIONS: A BLACK PERSPECTIVE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996). It is important to
note that the Herero were never enslaved; the different peoples of Africa have very different
colonial histories.
101 See, e.g., Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States of
America's Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analy-
sis of African American Reparations, 43 How. L.J. 171 (2000); Rhonda V. Magee, The Mas-
ter's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Main-
stream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993); Imari A. Obadele, Repa-
rations Now! A Suggestion Toward the Framework of a Reparations Demand and a Set of Le-
gal Underpinnings, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 369 (1988); Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations
for African Americans, 41 How. L. REV. 479 (1998); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear
It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993); Robert
Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40
B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998).
102 Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 3745, 101st
Cong. (1989); H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991). This has been re-introduced annually since its
initial introduction and has always died in committee. See Ozer, supra note 101, at 487; Ver-
dun, supra note 101, at 659-67. The Conyers bill is modeled after the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)), which led to reparations payments for Japanese Americans. See
Magee, supra note 101, at 876-80.
103 Ricardo Rene Laremont, Political Versus Legal Strategies for the African Slavery Move-
ment 1, http:l/www.africa.ufl.edu/asqlv2/v2i4a3.htm (unpublished manuscript).
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of genocide committed against their nation by the German army, acting under
specific orders in carrying out German colonial policy in the Herero War of
1904-07. Thus, the Herero nation is the injured party, acting on behalf of the
60,000 Herero dead in bringing the reparations claim. Although these people are
clearly the grandmothers and grandfathers of every living Herero person, it is
not their families who are making the claim. This formulation is deliberately
designed to be broadly analogous to the successful war reparations claims re-
sulting from German genocide in World War Two. The Herero nation is asking
for reparations from roughly the same position as the State of Israel. Although, a
"tribe" is not a "state," modem tribes represent their people in world forums,
and nothing in the international law of reparations requires that the aggrieved
people be represented by a state.
This has two equally precise legal purposes. No legal claim for repara-
tions is likely to be entertained unless it is possible to set damages. The "costs"
of colonialism and slavery over four hundred years are incalculable, and this is
some barrier to these claims. But courts, in tort cases, set the price of particular
human lives every day. The United States paid $1.2 billion to twenty thousand
Americans of Japanese ancestry for the loss of their property in World War
Two. 104 The Herero have asked for $600 million (US) - $10,000 for each human
victim; nothing for their land, nothing for their cattle. It is likely to be legally
difficult, even in a culture with an elaborate oral history, to prove who among
the Herero was killed, how, and where in the South West Africa of a hundred
years ago. The nature of the Herero claim, as a nation, however, renders this
unnecessary.
One final distinction between the Herero claim and the World War Two
era claims also suggests itself: the Herero claim is at least thirty years older.
Common sense suggests that there must be some time limit on reparations
claims, although no law absolutely states what this might be. The Herero claim
is based on a twentieth century act of genocide and grounded in similar claims
arising from other twentieth century wars. Modem South Africa permits native
claims for restitution of land back to the Native Land Act of 1913, a period
roughly the same as the Herero claim. 0 5 Moreover, the apartheid-era policies of
South Africa effectively blocked raising a reparations claim until independence
in 1990, and the Herero raised their claim almost immediately thereafter. The
United States and Canada, recognizing the legal difficulties Indian nations had
in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century in bringing land claims, have
not limited the time frame for Native American land restitution claims, and one
claim dating from 1795 is still being litigated."°6 For policy reasons, it makes no
104 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
105 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. See also REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA,
DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON LAND POLICY § 3.17 (1997); T.W. Bennett &
C.H. Powell, Aboriginal Title in South Africa Revisited, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 450
(1999).
106 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). This claim involves land
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sense to limit reparations to genocide to the actual victims: they are most often
dead, and that is precisely the nature of the evil of genocide. And, for the same
reasons, it also makes no sense to require that some modem state represent the
interests of a victimized people.
But, there are no formal legal rules governing the law of reparations.
The Herero have posed a political claim and are still awaiting political action on
the part of the German government. The claim is not justiciable in Namibian
courts.10 7 While there may ultimately be recourse to the World Court, the Herero
are aware that reparations regimes operant in the world today are political and
not legal. 0 8 But, these political actions have a common history of being moved
by extensive legal posturing, creating a powerful moral climate supporting
reparations, and shaping public opinion. This has been the main thrust of the
Herero effort at the present time; the dramatic confrontation of Chancellor Kohl
with the Herero chiefs and Truppenspieler attracted good press around the
world.
IV. THE POLITICS OF HERERO REPARATIONS IN NAMIBIA
The current government of Namibia is strongly opposed to the demands
of the Herero nation for reparations.' °9 The underlying reasons are rooted in the
politics of tribalism in the modem Namibian state. SWAPO, the ruling party, is
dominated by the Ovambo tribe, who constitute about half of the population,
about 700,000 people. There may be 125,000 Herero, no more than about eight
percent of the population."° The idea of a large reparations payment to the Her-
ero threatens the fragile political order of Namibia. Germany, in turn, has an
important relationship with the Namibian government that it is unwilling to
jeopardize.
After their return to South West Africa after World War One, the Her-
ero used a variety of subterfuges to re-occupy their lands. Herero "villages"
sprang up on deserted comers of white farms."' Stealing cattle became an insti-
taken by the State of New York in violation of a 1795 treaty. See id. at 229.
107 No Namibian court has been presented with any Herero reparation claims, and it is
unlikely that they ever will be. This conclusion is based both on (1) an assessment of the legal
doctrines in Namibia that might support a reparations claim from 1904-05 and (2) the fact that
neither the German, nor the American and Canadian courts were able to apply domestic law to
Jewish and Japanese reparations claims. Mary Reiko Osaka, Japanese Americans and Central
European Jews: A Comparison on Post-War Reparation Problems, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 211,226-32 (1981).
108 This attitude may be changing. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
109 Reparations Not on the Table, supra note 13.
110 MALAN, supra note 28, at 2, 4. The last Namibian census, conducted in 1991, did not, as a
matter of official policy, collect data on ethnic status. Therefore, all data reported on tribal
population are estimates.
II' Kruger & Henrichsen, supra note 62, at 151.
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tutionalized means of reparation, augmenting rapidly growing Herero herds."12
Over time, even within the confines of apartheid, they became a proud and pros-
perous people. The Herero incorporated a number of remnants of their German
heritage into their culture, including the Truppenspieler, and built close relation-
ships with the white agricultural population.' 3 The creation of a number of
reserves, mostly on marginal lands, later reconstituted as two Herero "home-
lands" on the margins of white farms, gave the Herero nation a substantial land
base, where large herds could be grazed.1 4 As South Africa withdrew from Na-
mibia, the Herero became politically active in the Democratic Turnhalle Alli-
ance, an inter-racial political party, with a program to take Namibia to inde-
pendence as an alternative to SWAPO's revolutionary armed struggle." 5 Al-
though many Herero fought with SWAPO, this put the Herero nation in the po-
sition of being politically opposed to SWAPO during the independence strug-
gle. 1 6 SWAPO has a long memory, viewing these Herero actions as "collabora-
tionist.",'7
The Herero, obviously, see their political history differently. Their claim
for reparations stems from their view that they occupy a special position in Na-
mibian colonial history, having been damaged disproportionately by German
colonialism. In their view, the Ovambo, and most other tribes, kept their lands
and escaped German genocide. The remarkable renewal of Herero culture in the
mid-twentieth century fed an isolationist Herero nationalist ideology that de-
fined their own history as distinct from the other black nations of Namibia, with
their survival of the "hellfire" of the war embodying their nation with unique
moral power."18
Within the South African apartheid-era system, the Herero effectively
utilized their "reserves," later "homelands," to rebuild their herds, and by 1940
they held 89,000 cattle, roughly the same number they held in 1895." 9 A large
and profitable dairying industry developed on the Herero reserves, and a number
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 The original Herero reserves, Aminuis, Epukiro, Eastern, Waterberg East, Otjohorongo,
and Ovitoto were reconstituted as a more compact and larger Herero "homeland," consisting of
Hereroland East and Hereroland West. A brief description of these reserves can be found in
RUTH FIRST, SOUTH WEST AFRICA 142-145 (1963). The strategy of the "homelands" in Namibia
was derived from the same policy in South Africa: a fiction that these black lands were "inde-
pendent" homelands, designed to make South West Africa a "white" nation. A.J. CHRISTOPHER,
THE ATLAS OF APARTHEID 182-84 (1994).
115 Id.
116 This is a very complicated political history. An outline of the independence process is
provided in JOSEPH DIESCHO, THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION IN PERSPECTIVE 8-35(1994).
117 Id.
118 GEWALD, supra note 24, at 284-85.
119 WERNER, supra note 25, at 187
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of Herero cattle were kept on white farms, under a variety of arrangements, of-
ten illegal. 120 Herero men most often avoided becoming farm and mine laborers
and remained on the reserves with their cattle. 121 A Report on Native Affairs in
1939 noted:
[T]he Hereros give evidence of possessing a far stronger feeling
of tribal consciousness than any of the other tribes in the Police
Zone.... They give more evidence of being politically minded
than any other tribe, and it is indeed in their tribe rather than in
any other that we may expect to see in the future the expression
of interests of a political character.122
All the political character of Herero interests went into their claims for
the restoration of their lands. In their view, the British had promised to restore
these lands when they conquered South West Africa in 1915. As early as 1919
the Herero had sent a letter to Lord Buxton, the British Governor General of
South West Africa:
We want a piece of land where we can live as a nation and
where our families can grow into a nation . . . We ask the
Government to put us together so that we may again become a
nation, we are now scattered. From the Herero-war till now we
have been seattered far and wide. We have been captives long
enough, we want to be free. 123
The British kept the land kept in the hands of the German and Boer farmers. The
Herero made a number of complaints to the United Nations after 1946, invaria-
bly demanding the restoration of their lands.
The current demand for reparations is best viewed simply as the logical
extension of these Herero demands for, in effect, reparations. With the creation
of an independent Namibian state in 1990, Herero land claims were merged with
a broad-based need for land reform, a central demand of all the liberation
movements in southern Africa where the most valuable lands have long been
white owned. 124 But, after 1990, Herero demands for land must be assertedagainst a Namibian government, not a colonial state, and must be processed
120 Id.
121 WERNER, supra note 25, at 191-216.
122 LORD HALLEY, REPORT ON NATIVE AFFAIRS IN SWA 128 (1939).
123 Kruger & Henrichsen, supra note 62, at 152 (quoting "Herero Adresse" in F. Rudolf
Lehman, "Geschichte der 'Truppenspieler' undter den Herero in Sudwestafrika," 38-39 (unpub-
lished manuscript).
124 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR NAMIBIA: NAMIBIA: PERSPECTIVES FOR NATIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 106-149 (1986).
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along with all of the other demands for land raised by all of the indigenous
tribes. The remarkable record of the Herero in rebuilding their cattle culture in
Hereroland does not support their claims against other Namibian tribes, each
with their own distinct history of colonial oppression. This is particularly true of
the Ovambo, who not only govern Namibia, but also occupy an overcrowded
and overgrazed land in the far north.
SWAPO, rooted in the Ovambo, as the current Namibian government,
has also played a mean and petty politics of domination against other Namibian
peoples. The Himba, another Herero tribe, have been shabbily treated in the
context of a proposed hydro-power scheme. 125 The Basters have lost many of
their land rights in a long-standing dispute with the government. The Fwe in
Caprivi raised a small insurrection in 1999.126 One hundred Herero traditional
leaders, including Paramount Chief Riruako, marched on the Namibian govern-
ment in 1998 to protest the lack of legal recognition of their status. 127 All of this
demonstrates a complex pattern of Ovambo domination over smaller tribes -
and all tribes in Namibia are much smaller than the Ovambo.
Thus, a Herero demand for reparations may well be more effective in-
ternationally than a demand for land within Namibia, particularly when all in-
ternal "land reform" measures have been stalled since independence.' 28 The goal
of reparations, however, is largely (but not entirely) to buy land, coming back
full circle to the Herero demand for the return of their "stolen lands", the lands
lost to the German colonizers both before and after the Herero War. Not only
does the claim for reparations represent perhaps their best chance to get back
some of their lands, but it also continues to build Herero political consciousness.
The unique nature of their claim for reparations is based on their particular his-
tory in Namibia, their heroic war against German imperialism. This, in turn, sets
the Herero apart from other Namibian tribes - which is precisely their political
125 Sidney L. Harring, God Gave Us This Land: The OvaHimba, the Proposed Epupa Dam,
the Independent Namibian State, and Law and Development in Africa, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 35 (2001).
126 All Hell Breaks Loose in Caprivi, THE NAMIBIAN, Sept. 4, 1999, at
http://www.namibian.com.naIFocus/caprivi/hell.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). What occurred
on August 2, 1999 is not entirely clear and there is some evidence that the government of Na-
mibia has exaggerated the nature of the "insurrection." MARIA FISCH, THE SECESSIONIST
MOVEMENT IN THE CAPRIVI: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1999). Mishake Muyongo, the Fwe
leader, was a former SWAPO party official, currently serving as a DTA member of Parliament,
abandoning his seat when he fled for exile in Denmark. Hundreds of other Fwe and Bushmen
remain in Botswana. Obviously, in a small country, holding hundreds of people in prison facing
treason charges has an impact on the political culture: the government intends to vigorously
punish the rebellious Fwe to make a point with other minority groups.
127 Herero Chiefs March on Government, ELECTRONIC MAIL & GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 1998, at
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98apr2/24apr-namibia.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy on
file with the West Virginia Law Review). Under the Traditional Authorities Act, traditional
chiefs have local governmental powers and are paid a salary by the Namibian state.
128 DONNA PANKHURST, A RESOLVABLE CONFLICT: THE POLITICS OF LAND IN NAMIBIA 102-
129 (1996).
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objective.
This has some significant internal consequences in Namibia. At the out-
set, it enrages many non-Herero, especially the Ovambo, who have their own
history forged by another war, the war for independence. This serves to isolate
the Herero internally. In addition, because the Government of Namibia opposes
Herero reparations, this opposition is likely to undermine the possibility of the
Herero ever collecting any reparations from Germany. The German government
itself has taken this as the core of its policy, announcing that "the issue of repa-
rations would not be considered. . . as Namibia was already receiving preferen-
tial financial support from Germany," - DM 1 billion since independence.1 29
This isolation, however, also builds a tribal political consciousness. Ef-
fective strategies of confronting this kind of political adversity have kept the
Herero powerful and economically well-off since the 1920s. This consciousness,
we cannot forget, was built during South African-era rule. In this context, politi-
cal or economic confrontation with SWAPO and the Ovambo does not daunt
Herero leaders. Maintaining tribal cohesion in a modernizing world is an ex-
tremely difficult problem for tribal peoples everywhere. Herero politics manages
to meet this challenge very effectively. 30 Without their claim for reparations,
the Herero are simply one relatively small tribe occupying a dusty and over-
grazed corner of southern Africa. With the claim, the Herero may one day sit
and negotiate with Germany.
V. CONCLUSION
The Herero claim for reparations against Germany for genocide in the
Herero War deserves to be heard. At its most basic level, it factually represents
one of the best cases possible for opening the question of reparations for colo-
nial oppression against the various imperial powers. The direct founding of this
claim in the specific context of Germany's responsibility for reparations for
Jewish victims of World War Two era genocide directly raises the question:
how is colonial era genocide different from modem European genocide? In an
impoverished Africa, it cannot be surprising that the indigenous people there
cannot accept the legitimacy of two regimes of international law, one for Euro-
129 Reparations Not on the Table, supra note 13. (quoting Hans Buttner, Spokesperson for
the Southern African Development Community in the German Parliament). Buttner also
claimed that Germany has already contributed (DM) I billion in development aid to Namibia,
as well as contributing 30% of the European Economic Community aid and that "the best way
to assist Namibians is through development aid." See id.
130 Absalom Shigwedha, Namibia Row over Circumcision Torture, ELECTRONIC MAIL &
GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 1997, at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97febl/14feb-
namcircumcision.htmi (last visited Oct. 12, 2001) (copy on file with the West Virginia Law
Review) reports a number of Namibian authorities condemning the public circumcision of an
eleven year old boy at the house of Herero paramount chief Kuaimi Riruako. The Herero
proudly held the event in front of a BBC film crew, celebrating it as a part of their traditional
culture.
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peans, another for Africans. Because the. Herero claim is narrow based on a par-
ticular - and well-documented - act of twentieth century genocide, in a particu-
lar colonial war, against a nation with a record of recidivism at genocide, it is an
appropriate case for a reparations claim against Germany.
To proceed on this basis says no more about the possibility of similar
claims from other indigenous tribes massacred in twentieth century colonial
wars than the American recognition of the Japanese American claim for repara-
tions reaches the dozens of other peoples dislocated by World War Two. There
is no clearly recognized regime in international law for reparations. This is an
emerging area of international human rights law, best approached on a case by
case basis. This is not to say that the Herero claim does not present significant
problems and challenges in international and human rights law.
A central need in Namibia, and more broadly in southern Africa, is the
need for land reform. Black people only live as menial laborers on the farms of
central Namibia. The Namibian government has been unable to deliver on its
promise of land reform just as the Zimbabwean government has failed to de-
liver. There are a number of reasons for this failure, including a lack of funds to
purchase white owned farms followed by the lack of education and experience
of blacks to make a success at the business of commercial agriculture.
A metaphorical exercise in Africa is "turning back the clock", imagin-
ing a prosperous black Africa. One place where this can happen is in central
Namibia; Herero herdsmen can simply move their cattle to the existing white
farms and take over. There is no inherent reason why blacks cannot graze cattle
on large farms; it takes good water, good grass, and some experience with ani-
mal husbandry - all of which the Herero have. Thus, one small experiment with
land reform is ready to move forward - and likely would if Germany paid the
Herero $600 million (US) - roughly the price of 1000 of the 4000 white-owned
commercial farms in Namibia.131 About one-fourth of the land reform in Na-
mibia could be financed through this reparations policy. Obviously, the clock
can never be turned back in Africa. But, the Herero, one tribe, could go back to
their herds and make a living for themselves and their families, pay taxes to
support further land reform in Namibia, and set one small example of what a"new," decolonized Africa might look like. Such a policy inherently supports
the existing Herero social and political order, which has many of the problems
of other African tribes. But, it is not possible to base redevelopment in Africa on
western social and political models.
This would not accomplish land reform in the rest of Namibia - and that
surely is a problem that will need to be dealt with. Continued inequality in Na-
mibia raises difficult political questions, but regimes of land reform, on an im-
131 See generally FIONA ADAMS, WOLFGANG WERNER & PETER VALE, THE LAND ISSUE IN
NAMIBIA: AN INQUIRY (Namibia Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of
Namibia, Windhoek, 1990) (copy on file with author). Sidney L. Harring, "The Stolen Lands"
Under the Constitution of Namibia: Land Reform under the Rule of Law (copy on file with the
West Virginia Law Review) (unpublished paper presented at "Ten Years of Namibian Nation-
hood" on Sept. 12, 2000).
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poverished continent, cannot be rooted in the continued poverty of those receiv-
ing land. Land reform must move forward, and the Herero development of about
1000 farms - the core of the former Herero lands -- still leaves three quarters of
the land reform in Namibia, 3000 farms, for other tribes, using other economic
and political programs. Each African tribe is different, with its own culture and
its own needs for development. The Herero might even be asked to use part of
their reparations to support other indigenous agricultural development schemes
in central Namibia. Damaraland, Namaland, and Ovamboland are impoverished
communal lands, without the potential for agricultural development that central
Namibia enjoys. No single model of land reform is likely to be successful.
Any "reparations" model is not a perfect model upon which to base land
reform and economic development. It is inherently unequal, rooted in historical
wrong, and of benefit to a select group of recipients, the descendents of victims
of that wrong. These people are entitled to "reparations" not because they are
inherently more worthy than other people living in the world, but because of
their identity in relationship to some group. This is simply the way a reparations
model works. Herero reparations are not a perfect model for economic devel-
opment in Namibia - but that is not the standard on which the legal concept of
reparations is judged. The purpose of such reparations is not simply to make the
victims "whole" again, for that is never possible. Rather, it is to set a model of
international human rights by forcing nations that commit genocide to acknowl-
edge their responsibility and pay reparations. The Herero, as are any people vic-
timized by genocide, are entitled to bring their claim for reparations forward.
Germany should consider it in the same legal framework that it has considered
reparations claims of other peoples victimized by German genocide. The inter-
national community, and the various international human rights organizations,
should insist on it.
No single model for reconstruction, land reform, and social develop-
ment will work for every people in Africa. The process of colonialism engaged
each people in a historically specific way. The tribe is a powerful political and
cultural force, with great potential to work constructively in modern Africa.
"Tribalism," a culture of advancing tribal interests through conflict, also runs
great risks, and is capable of great harm, including, all too often, new incidents
of genocide in post-colonial Africa.' 32 But the concept of reparations is designed
132 Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221 (2000); Dora Lee Peacock, It Happened and It Can Happen Again,
The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 899
(1997); Panel Discussion, Fifty Years of the U.N. Genocide Convention: What Does it Mean for
Africa, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 173, (1999). The mass murder of Tutsi by rival Hutu
in Rwanda is only the best known of many incidents of tribal acts of genocide in post-colonial
Africa. Human Rights Watch between 1997 and 2000 published reports on mass killings based
on tribal identity in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Burundi, Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, and Sudan. See Human Rights Watch Report, Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civil-
ians and Silencing Protest, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/drc/DrcOO5.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002); Human Rights Watch Report, Democratic Republic of Congo: Casual-
ties of War, available at http:/www.hrw.org/reports/l1999/congo (last visited Feb. 25, 2002);
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to hold those responsible for genocide accountable and to advance a culture of
human rights, not to unfairly benefit a small group of beneficiaries. The Herero
are working within a democratic framework in modern Namibia, pursuing their
goals openly, non-violently, and consistent with broad principles of international
law. There is no reason to deny, out of hand, their demand for reparations be-
cause it advances the interests of one particular tribe. If other African nations or
peoples wish to bring forward other claims for reparations, against Germany or
any other country, there is no reason not to move these through whatever politi-
cal and legal processes exist for resolving such claims. This process, indeed, is
how international law develops, growing and changing to meet new needs.
Each people in the world has a right to at least argue its own definition
of its history in relationship to both other peoples of the world, and also in rela-
tionship to major events and trends in world history. For all the diversity of ex-
periences of the many nations and tribes of Africa, not much of this kind of his-
tory has been brought forward. The Herero, in bringing forward their reparations
claim, have done so both as a statement of their place in modem Namibia and in
the world. The German Reichstag, sitting in Berlin, the Prussian capital, can
debate the political question of why reparations is the policy for Germany's
World War Two era genocide, but not its African genocide of thirty years ear-
lier. And it may one day have to do this as Herero Truppenspielers march up
Unter den Linden, gather at the Brandenburg Gate, and their chiefs denounce
German colonialism in good Namibian German. Reparations claims are never
heard outside of their political context, and the Herero people will have to bring
political pressure on modern Germany to rethink their responsibility for their
actions in the Herero War.
Finally, in a world with recurring examples of genocide often (but obvi-
ously not always) occurring in the context of small, third world wars, it is
important to learn whatever lessons can be learned from the history of these
wars and from the efforts of the aggrieved populations to seek reparations. As
difficult as the legal issues of reparations are from these wars, it is far better for
the world to know about these events and to discuss and study them than to bury
this history, forgetting that these wars, like the Herero War, ever happened.
Human Rights Watch Report, Democratic Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is Hiding:
Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports97/congo (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002); Human Rights Watch Report, Nigeria: Crackdown in the Niger Delta,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/l1999/nigeria2 (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); Human
Rights Watch Report, Burundi: Neglecting Justice in Making Peace, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000burundi (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); Human Rights Watch
Report, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/l1999/sierra (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); Human Rights Watch Re-
port, Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/ (1998); Human Rights Watch Report, Leave None to Tell
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